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'
could be used followed by the attorney acting for it.
"6 Although this
procedure has not yet been adopted, Teichman seems to suggest that
verification in this manner would be permissible. However, a second
suggestion of the Advisory Committee, 7 which would permit attorneys
to merely certify, has not been adopted by the legislature, and the
courts lack the power to implement it. The purpose of this latter
technique would be to place greater emphasis upon the client's verac88
ity.
The Teichman court's holding will undoubtedly be welcomed
by the busy practitioner who is often out of town and unable to perform the mechanical function of signing a verification. The question
remains, however, whether this practice can be extended to affirmations
made pursuant to CPLR 2106. Since 2106 is intended to save an attorney time and trouble,8 9 it would seem that the courts might be inclined
to approve this procedure as well. However, since the sanction for
false swearing is conviction for perjury,90 the signature of an associate
should not suffice under such circumstances.

CPLR 3025(b): Leave to amend answer denied because plaintiff would
be prejudiced thereby.
Leave to amend pleadings shall be freely given. 9' However, a court
may, in its discretion, impinge upon this statutory latitude.92 In JamesSmith v. Rottenberg,93 an action for breach of a contract for the sale
of realty, the defendant's answer contained only a general denial.
However, two years later he moved to amend his answer so as to include the affirmative defenses of fraud and illegality. The appellate
division, reversing the trial court, denied the motion. The court found
that the bases of the affirmative defenses were known, or should have
been known, at the time the original complaint was served. 94
86 FixsT REP. 73-74.
87 Compare FINAL REP. A-426 with SLxcm REP. 43, 277-78.

88 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3020, supp. commentary 175, 176 (1969). For a severe
criticism of the verification process as it exists in New York see Professor Siegel's remarks.
Id. at 175-77.
89 2A WK&M 2106.01 (1969).
90 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 210A0 (McKinney 1967).
91 CPLR 3025(b).
92 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3025, supp. commentary 191, 193 (1969): "3025(b) intends
the 'widest possible discretion' to be lodged in the court .. "
93 32 App. Div. 2d 792, 302 N.Y.S.2d 355 (2d Dep't 1969).
94 See 3 WK&M 1 3025.15 (1969) wherein it is noted that:
[S]ome cases have held that leave will be denied if the moving party knew or
should have known of the facts or the cause of action sought to be added at the
time of the original pleading and cannot satisfactorily explain his failure to
plead them at that time.

1970.]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

Leave to amend is generally denied where the opposing party
would be prejudiced.9 5 In the instant case the plaintiff, who was
elderly and in ill-health, had prepared her case on the basis of the
general denial. Therefore, the court recognized that to permit the
amendment would clearly be prejudicial. The decision is in accord
with prior case law9" and serves as a good example of the type of
prejudice that would be a basis for a denial of a motion to amend
pleadings.
AxTicLE 31 - DiscLosuRE
CPLR 3101(d): Evidence gathered by insurer in preparation for defense of insured is not "'materialprepared for litigation" in separate
action against the insurer.
The scope of CPLR 3101(d), which grants a conditional privilege
for material created in preparation for litigation, has recently been
narrowed. Collins v. Jamestown Mutual Insurance Co. 97 involved an
action by an injured plaintiff against an insurer. The "insured" had
defaulted in an earlier action brought against him by the plaintiff
after the insurer had disclaimed coverage and refused to defend. The
"insured" then assigned to the plaintiff all rights he might have against
the defendant-insurer. The court compelled the defendant to disclose
any evidence relating to its investigation of the accident. 98 The court
did not have to respond to the insurer's contention that the material
sought was absolutely privileged from disclosure by virtue of an "insurer-insured" relationship since there was no showing that any statements from the insured to the insurer were involved. Moreover, since
this privilege would presumably belong solely to the insured, 9 the
plaintiff might have successfully argned that even if such statements
were involved, any privilege attaching to them was impliedly waived
905
See, e.g., Ciccone v. Glenwood Holding Corp., 44 Misc. 2d 273, 253 N.Y.S.2d 576

(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Kings County 1964) (defendant's motion to amend answer to allege plaintiff was an employee denied because plaintiff's right to workmen's compensation, his sole
remedy as an "employee," was barred by statute of limitations).
90 See Winslow v. Bellaire, Inc., 232 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962); Kamen
v. State, 34 Misc. 2d 380, 228 N.YS.2d 749 (Ct. Cl. 1962). Cf. De Fabio v. Nadier Rental
Service, Inc., 27 App. Div. 2d 931, 278 N.Y.S.2d 723 (2d Dep't 1967) holding that where a
party who wishes to amend has or should have knowledge of facts at the time of original

pleading, and does not amend for a long period of time, his motion will be denied because of gross laches.
O7 32 App. Div. 2d 725, 300 N.Y.S2d 391 (3d Dep't 1969).
98 It can be assumed that these materials, under normal circumstances, would be considered "materials prepared for litigation." See Kandel v. Tocher, 22 App. Div. 2d 513,
256 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Ist Dep't 1965).
99 Cf. W. RicsAmsoN, EVmIENC, § 434 (J. Prince 9th ed. 1964).

